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Abstract
We study the characteristics of self-selected candidates in corrupt political systems.
Potential candidates dier along two dimensions of unobservable character: public
spirit (altruism toward others) and honesty (the disutility suered when selling out to
special interests after securing oce). Both aspects combine to determine an individ-
ual's quality as governor. We characterize properties of equilibrium candidate pools
for arbitrary costs of running for oce. As the cost of running vanishes, there is an
essentially unique candidate pool, which is typically highly asymmetric: it consists of
only the most dishonest individuals but a mixture of the most selsh and the most
public-spirited ones. We explore how two policy instruments | the governor's com-
pensation and anti-corruption enforcement | aect the expected quality of governance
through candidate self-selection. We also examine the eects of incumbency and term
limits on self-selection in a dynamic version of the model.
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1\Ninety-eight percent of the adults in this country are decent, hardworking,
honest Americans. It's the other lousy two percent that get all the publicity. But
then, we elected them." | Lily Tomlin
1 Introduction
According to one long-standing and widespread view, representative democracies suer from
a pernicious adverse selection problem: the citizens who are best suited to govern are least
likely to seek oce. Drawing on the citizen-candidate models of representative democracy
due to Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996), a recent and growing
literature has examined the nature of candidate self-selection with respect to ability (or
competence).1 Yet concerns over adverse self-selection extend beyond candidates' abilities,
to questions of character. As the political scientist V.O. Key quipped, \If the people can only
choose among rascals, they are certain to choose a rascal."(Key, 1966) Some commentators
attribute the purported prevalence of rascals among politicians to special interest groups,
suggesting that they sully the political process and attract those of low character while
discouraging those with conscience.
It is not obvious, however, that one should expect negative rather than positive can-
didate self-selection along all pertinent dimensions of character. On the one hand, oce-
holding provides opportunities for personal rent-seeking at the expense of the public good,
which are presumably more attractive to selsh than public-spirited citizens. But on the
one hand, the opportunities to promote the greater good that accompany oce-holding are
presumably more attractive to public-spirited citizens than to selsh ones.
The literature on candidate self-selection has largely ignored questions of character.2
In this paper, we study candidate self-selection with respect to two dimensions of character:
public spirit (dened as altruism toward other citizens) and honesty (dened as susceptibility
to corruption). In our model, citizens who run for oce may hope to benet from both
legitimate compensation (salary and ego-rents) and illicit compensation (contributions or
bribes from interest groups). They bear campaign costs and, if elected, eort costs associated
1See, e.g., Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Poutvaara and Takalo (2007), Mattozzi
and Merlo (2008, 2010), and Dal B o et al. (2006).
2Exceptions include Caselli and Morelli (2001) (the working paper version of Caselli and Morelli (2004)),
and Besley (2004), both of which focus on a characteristic that can be interpreted as honesty. Below, we
clarify the relationships between those papers and the current analysis.
2with producing public goods. Each citizen also recognizes that, if elected, his character will
impact the quality of governance and hence general welfare. Character aects the tradeos
between these costs and benets. However, a candidate's character is not observed by the
electorate (at least not initially). Thus, having a better character than one's opponents
does not guarantee election.
A central feature of our model is that, as a consequence of the competing considerations
noted in the previous paragraph, the incentive to enter is a U-shaped function of public
spirit. Moreover, dishonest citizens extract greater rents from holding oce because of
special interest politics. As a result, the citizens with the greatest incentive to run for oce
are those who are maximally dishonest, and either maximally or minimally public-spirited.
As we show, this property has important implications for candidate self-selection.
We nd that for any given number of candidates, the set of equilibria (if non-empty)
is typically characterized by non-trivial lower and upper bounds on the expected quality
of governance. Candidates tend to be of intermediate quality: neither too good, because
opponents would then drop out, nor too bad, because others would then enter. Thus there
tends to be a negative correlation between public-spiritedness and honesty among candidates,
even when those characteristics are uncorrelated in the population. Equilibria may be either
symmetric (with candidates of identical or similar quality) or asymmetric (with candidates of
sharply dierent quality), but in some cases all equilibria with a given number of candidates
are asymmetric. The asymmetry is a direct consequence of the U-shaped entry incentives
noted in the previous paragraph. Thus, the model generates endogenous volatility in the
quality of governance.
We investigate the eects of changes in two public policy instruments: the governor's
compensation and the level of anti-corruption enforcement. The eects of these policies on
the costs and benets of holding oce depend on a candidate's character; hence, beyond any
incentive eects once in oce, the policies alter the composition of the self-selected candidate
pool. As the set of equilibria for a given number of candidates tends to be large (when it
is non-empty), we focus on the comparative statics for the best and worst equilibria. For
equilibria with a given number of candidates, the expected quality of governance in the best
equilibria rises with the level of the governor's compensation, but does not improve, and may
even decline, with the level of anti-corruption enforcement. Subject to some qualications,
the quality of governance in the worst equilibria typically improves when the governor's
compensation rises, but declines when anti-corruption enforcement becomes more vigorous.
3Thus, if one ignores possible changes in the number of candidates, higher compensation tends
to promote good governance, while anti-corruption enforcement is surprisingly counterpro-
ductive (and at best ineective). The latter result holds even though enforcement reduces
the degree to which any given governor would make concessions to special interests; it turns
out that perverse selection eects overwhelm the benecial pure incentive eects.
Compensation and anti-corruption policies may also aect the existence of equilibria for
any given number of candidates, thereby forcing that number to change. With respect to
the quality of governance, selection eects owing through the number of candidates tend to
work in the opposite direction from the eects discussed in the previous paragraph. Thus,
the overall eects of the governor's compensation and anti-corruption enforcement on the
quality of governance are surprisingly complex.
Fortunately, it is possible to evaluate the overall eects of the policy interventions |
owing through changes in the number of candidates, the composition of the candidate
pool for a given number of candidates, and the behavior of a given candidate once in oce
| when the costs of running for oce are vanishingly small (a common assumption in
the \citizen-candidate" literature). Multiple-candidate equilibria converge to an essentially
unique limiting equilibrium, which we characterize. The equilibrium is typically asymmetric,
with a candidate pool consisting of citizens with the greatest incentives to run for oce: those
who are maximally dishonest, and (due to the U-shaped entry incentives noted above) either
maximally or minimally public-spirited. In other words, with small costs of running for
oce, only highly asymmetric equilibria survive. Thus, the model has the strong implication
that there is no variability in the predictable (dis)honesty of politicians, but substantial
variability in the quality of governance through volatility in the public-spiritedness of the
electoral victor.
For the limiting multiple-candidate equilibrium, we show that an increase in anti-
corruption enforcement unambiguously improves the quality of governance. While this
nding is consistent with simple intuition, the mechanism is surprising: for a wide range
of parameter values, anti-corruption enforcement is on balance benecial only because it
reduces the number of candidates in equilibrium, thereby indirectly improving selection. In
contrast, an increase in the governor's compensation has no overall eect, either benecial
or adverse; salary is surprisingly irrelevant.
We study the eects of incumbency and term limits by extending the model to a multi-
period setting. Assuming character is at least partially revealed during a governor's rst
4term, reelection opportunities can raise the quality of governance through two channels.
The rst is mechanical: the electorate gains the opportunity to reelect desirable incumbents.
The second operates through selection eects: the benets of running for oce in the rst
place rise for high-quality candidates (for whom the odds of re-election are high) relative
to low-quality candidates (for whom the odds are low). We show that a two-term limit
unambiguously improves the quality of governance in non-incumbent elections compared to
a one-term limit, due to self-selection eects arising from the possibility of re-election. In
such settings, re-election patterns can corroborate the adage that voters prefer a known crook
to an unknown crook. We also show that a two-term limit can have adverse self-selection
eects compared to a one-term limit if experience in oce suciently enhances the ability
to extract rents from special interests.
As noted above, we are not the rst to study self-selection with respect to any aspect
of candidate character (as opposed to competence). Caselli and Morelli (2001) (the working
paper version of Caselli and Morelli (2004)) and Besley (2004) consider models in which
candidates self-select based on a characteristic which one can interpret as honesty.3 Neither
studies selection with respect to public-spiritedness, which is central to our analysis. Both
show that higher compensation improves the quality of the candidate pool, but neither
explicitly models special-interest inuence activities or studies anti-corruption enforcement.
Their analyses of self-selection with respect to honesty also involve very dierent mechanisms
than the one examined here,4 and these dierences account for our contrasting conclusions
concerning the eects of compensation.5
In studying the eects of special-interest inuence activities on candidate self-selection,
our work is also related to Dal B o et al. (2006) and Besley and Coate (2001). However, Dal
B o et al. (2006) focus on candidates' ability rather than character, while Besley and Coate
(2001) analyze candidates' policy preferences. Moreover, Dal B o et al. (2006) are primarily
3In Caselli and Morelli (2001), candidates dier in a binary propensity to extract rents from a randomly
encountered citizen; in Besley (2004), they are either \congruent" or \dissonant" with the electorate.
4Caselli and Morelli assume that a candidate's honesty is observable; dishonest candidates successfully
run for oce when the supply of honest candidates is insucient to ll all available positions. Because the
quality of governance is assumed to reect the combined decisions of a continuum of oce holders, honest
candidates are not motivated by the desire to displace dishonest oce holders, as they are in our model.
Besley's assumptions concerning candidates' payos likewise remove any incentive to displace dissonant oce
holders. Furthermore, he assumes that the costs of running for oce are zero, rather than vanishingly small.
As a result, the pool of candidates does not consist of the citizens with the greatest incentives to run for
oce, as it does in our model.
5For example, in Besley's model, if the costs of running for oce were vanishingly small rather than zero,
all candidates would be dissonants with poor private-sector prospects, and as in our framework, compensation
would have no impact on the quality of candidate pool.
5concerned with the interest groups' choice between violence and bribes (see also Dal B o and
Di Tella (2003)).
Finally, our analysis of incumbency is related to Smart and Sturm (2006), who study
the impact of term limits in a setting where politicians can signal public spiritedness through
their actions in oce. In their setting, term limits can be benecial because they reduce the
incentives for selsh politicians to mimic public spirited ones (in order to win reelection), thus
providing the electorate with greater ability to identify an incumbent's type. We abstract
from that mechanism in order to highlight self-selection eects, which are absent in Smart
and Sturm (2006).
The next section lays out the basic model. After some preliminary analysis (Section 3),
we study outcomes of the one-period and multi-period games in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs appear in the Appendix, and a supplementary Appendix
available at the authors' webpages contains additional material.
2 The Model
We consider a society consisting of a continuum of citizens. Each citizen consumes two
goods, a public good x and a private good r. For convenience, we normalize each citizen's
endowment of the private good to zero. Citizens dier with respect to two preference
parameters: a public spirit parameter a 2 [0;1], and an honesty parameter h 2 [0;1]. The
public spirit parameter, a, measures the degree to which a citizen cares about the well-being
of other citizens. The honesty parameter, h, will come into play only if a citizen holds oce;
it determines the size of a utility penalty the individual suers if he accepts payments from
special interests. The magnitude of h could reect susceptibility to pangs of conscience,
aversion to social stigma or penalties, or skill at evading detection. We will refer to the pair
(a;h) as a citizen's character.
Citizens who choose to run for oce incur a personal campaign cost, k > 0. As in other
citizen-candidate analyses, we sometimes consider cases in which k is vanishingly small. The
purpose of considering k small rather than zero is to assure that the expected number of
candidates is nite and the probability of winning for any candidate is non-zero.
Governance One citizen eventually becomes governor (as detailed below). The governor
receives compensation s, which includes a salary and any ego benets/costs from holding
6oce. He exerts eort e  0 to produce f (e)  0 units of the public good at a personal
cost c(e), where both f() and c() are twice-dierentiable functions.6 Eort has positive
but declining marginal returns (f0 > 0 > f00), as well as positive and increasing marginal
costs (c0 > 0 and c00 > 0). We also assume f(0) = c(0) = 0 and f0 (0) > c0 (0), so that
the governor undertakes some eort regardless of his character. The governor must also
decide whether to undertake a special-interest project (n = 1 denotes yes, n = 0 denotes
no), which provides highly concentrated benets to a special interest group (as described
next). If implemented, the project is funded by a per-capita lump-sum tax, q > 0, levied
on all citizens (including the governor).
Special Interests There is one special interest group or lobby, denoted L, which receives
a payo v  0 if n = 1, and v = 0 if n = 0. Afer the governor is elected, v is drawn from
a cumulative distribution (v) with support [0;v] and density (v) > 0 for v 2 [0;v]. L
can attempt to inuence the governor by promising him a payment, t  0, contingent on
n = 1. The governor can either accept the payment and choose n = 1, or refuse it and
choose n = 0. Accepting a payment triggers a utility penalty on the governor of g (h;)  0.
The penalty depends upon the governor's honesty, h, as well as a policy variable,  2 [0;],
which indicates the level of anti-corruption enforcement.7 We assume g is twice continuously
dierentiable with gh > 0 and g > 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Thus,
higher levels of honesty and anti-corruption enforcement imply higher personal costs of selling
out to special interests.
For simplicity, we assume that prior to oering its contingent payment, L learns not
only the stakes (v) but also the governor's true character (a and h), perhaps from their
interaction after the governor takes oce. We also assume that the contingent tranfer, t,
is determined by generalized Nash bargaining between the governor and L: specically, the
governor extracts the fraction  > 0 of any surplus from the project.8
6For simplicity, the governor's eort is the only input for producing public goods.
7One can think of
@g
@ as reecting the impact of anti-corruption enforcement on the likelihood of detection
and penalization.
8Other models of lobbying yield similar results. In an earlier draft, we assumed that two lobby groups
would compete via a menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) to implement conicting special-interest
projects.
7Net Payos Let r denote the level of private good consumption for the typical non-
candidate citizen. Preferences over the elements x, ri, and r are given by
U(x;ri;r) = (x + ri) + a(x + r): (1)
Thus, each individual values her personal well-being and the well-being of the average citizen,
where the latter is weighted by her public spiritedness, a.9 If i is a non-candidate citizen,
then ri = r =  nq,10 so
Ui(x;ri;r) = (1 + a)(x   nq);
whereas if i is a losing candidate, ri =  nq   k and r =  nq, so
Ui(x;ri;r) = (1 + a)(x   nq)   k:
We will use the index G to denote the governor. If G does not accept payments from
L (so that n = 0), his payo takes the same form as that of a losing candidate, except that
he receives compensation, s, and incurs the disutility of eort, c(e), to produce the public
good. If G accepts a payment t  0 from L (so that n = 1), he also receives t and incurs a
utility penalty g(hG;). Thus






Throughout, we will make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The distribution of character (a;h) has full support on [0;1]  [0;1].
Candidates of the four extreme types will play signicant roles in our analysis: those
with maximal public spirit and maximal honesty, a = h = 1 (Saints); those with minimal
public spirit and minimal honesty, a = h = 0 (Scoundrels); those with maximal public spirit
and minimal honesty (Sell-Outs); and those with minimal public spirit and maximal honesty
(Principled Egoists).
9Even though citizens are altruistic, the payos of candidates and the governor do not show up in a
typical citizen's utility function, because those individuals are of measure zero. Likewise, we do not include
the special interest group's payo in any citizen's utility, because the interest group is assumed to have
constituents of measure zero (and the governor himself is not a constituent).
10Recall that we normalized private good endowment to 0 and the project is funded by a per-capita tax
of q.
8Elections We assume that only political insiders have the opportunity to run for oce.11
The distribution of insiders' characteristics is representative of the population and has full
support on the character space, [0;1]  [0;1]. The mass of insiders is negligable, so the
election is determined by political outsiders, who share the objective of maximizing x + r.
For simplicity, we assume that political insiders know each others' characters (implicitly
through past dealings and reputation), but no outsider knows the character of any yet-to-
be-elected insider. We also abstract from some of the strategic issues that can arise in voting
games, and instead make the following reasonable \black box" assumption:
Assumption 2. Every non-incumbent candidate for oce wins the election with equal prob-
ability.12
The logic of this assumption is straightforward: because new candidates are ex-ante
indistinguishable, each must have the same probability of victory.13 In the one-period
model (without incumbents), this assumption turns the election into a simple lottery, so
political outsiders are not strategic players. Moreover, because the insiders know each others'
characters, and because the character of the governor is revealed before other decisions are
made, the one-period game entails complete information.14
Sequence of Events In each election cycle, events unfold as follows:
1. Insiders decide whether to run for oce.
2. The governor is elected, and her character is observed by the lobby group and polit-
ical outsiders. If there are no candidates, no governor is elected and the quality of
governance is assumed to be very low (as detailed later).
11We assume that no insider is a constituent of the special interest group.
12Some care must be taken when the set of candidates is countably innite, because one cannot dene a
uniform probability measure on a countably innite space. What is important for our purposes, however,
is the probability with which any insider believes he will win the election if he runs, taking as given the
set of other candidates. We assume that this probability is zero when there is an innite number of other
candidates. The actual probability measure governing the winner's selection from the innite number of
candidates is inessential.
13In keeping with the citizen-candidate approach, candidates cannot commit to either eort or project
choices before they take oce, and cannot signal their character during the electoral process. In a Downsian
model, Kartik and McAfee (2007) study the policy consequences of an exogenous set of candidates trying to
signal character through their platforms.
14In multiple-period models, elections involving incumbents turn on voters' beliefs about the character of
the incumbent and the challengers. Hence, such models cannot be treated as games of complete information
unless one makes additional mechanical assumptions about incumbent elections; see Section 5.
93. The magnitude of lobbying stakes, v 2 [0;v], is realized, and is observed by the governor
and the interest group.
4. The lobby makes an oer to the governor, as determined by generalized Nash bargain-
ing.
5. The governor chooses eort, e  0, and a project implementation decision, n 2 f0;1g
(along with any necessary taxes).
We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game.
3 The Governor's Choices
In this section, we solve for post-election behavior, including the governor's choices of whether
to implement special interest project and how much eort to expend toward producing the
public good. For notational simplicity, in this section only we will use h and a without a G
superscript to denote the characteristics of the governor.
3.1 Eort Choice
The governor's eort is determined solely by his public spirit, and does not depend on his
honesty or the special-interest transfer.15 The optimal eort level, e (a), is given by the rst
order condition (1 + a)f0 (e (a)) = c0 (e (a)). Since f is strictly concave and c is strictly
convex, e() is strictly increasing. For every citizen j, let ej := e (aj) and xj := f (ej).
The contribution of the public good to the well-being of the governor is given by
 (a) := (1 + a)f (e
 (a))   c(e
 (a)):
By the envelope theorem, 0(a) = f(e(a)) > 0. Furthermore, 00(a) = f0(e(a))
de(a)
da > 0,
i.e. the governor's gain from providing the public good (measured as an equivalent variation
in units of the private good) is a convex function of the public spirit parameter, a. This
convexity property will prove important.
15This result follows from the assumed separability of utility. Our analysis only requires that the governor's
eort is increasing in his public spirit, which would also be the case under less restrictive assumptions.
103.2 The Lobbying Stage
Ignoring any transfer from the interest group, implementing the special-interest project im-
poses a cost on the governor of
v
(a;h;) := (1 + a)q + g(h;): (3)
Nash bargaining implies that the project will be implemented if and only if it generates
positive surplus for G and L combined, which requires v   v(a;h;) > 0.16 G receives the
fraction  of any positive surplus, so t = v + (1   )v(a;h;).
Because v(a;h;) is increasing in each argument, governors who are more public spir-
ited and more honest are less likely to accept special interest payments, and the frequency
with which any governor sells out declines with the level of anti-corruption enforcement.
Thus, one might expect anti-corruption enforcement to improve the quality of governance;
we will see, however, that matters are more complex.
Throughout, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 3. v(0;1;0) > v > v(1;0;).17
According to the rst inequality, a maximally honest governor never sells out even
if he is minimally public spirited (i.e., a Principled Egoist) and anti-corruption policy is
lax. According to the second inequality, even with maximal anti-corruption enforcement, a
minimally honest but maximally public spirited governor (i.e., a Sell-Out) always sells out if
the stakes are suciently high. We note that no governor (including a Scoundrel) will sell
out when v is suciently small, even under minimal anti-corruption policies.
The preceding discussion readily implies:
Lemma 1. A governor's expected rents from special interest politics, evaluated prior to the
realization of v, is Ev maxf[v   v(a;h;)];0g. The associated impact on the expected
payo of any other citizen with public spiritedness a0 is  (1 + a0)q [1   (v(a;h;))].
In what follows, it will be useful to understand how the governor's expected rents from
16We assume the project is not implemented when the surplus is zero; this is innocuous because the
distribution of v is absolutely continuous.
17Recall that v is the upper bound on v. Stated in terms of primitives, the assumption requires g(1;0)+q >
v > g(0;) + 2q.
11lobbying vary with his public spiritedness. Dierentiation yields
@
@a
Ev maxf[v   v








where both inequalities are strict when v > v(a;h;). Thus, a higher level of public
spiritedness reduces the expected rents for a governor from special interests. Furthermore,
the governor's expected payo from lobbying, like his benet from providing the public good,
(a), is a convex function of public spirit. This convexity property will also prove important.
4 The One-Period Game
In this section, we examine insiders' decisions to run for oce when there is just one election
with no incumbent. Given the continuation payos derived in Section 3, the problem reduces
to a simultaneous-move entry game. We focus initially on pure strategy Nash equilibria of
this game (assuming they exist). In Section 4.4, we assure existence by extending the
analysis to randomized entry decisions.
Let uG (a;h j ;s) be the expected payo (evaluated prior to the realization of lobbying
stakes, v) for a governor of type (a;h) ignoring entry cost k, and let u(a;h j a0;) be the
expected payo for a non-candidate of type a0 when the governor's type is (a;h). From
Section 3, we have
u
G (a;h j ;s) = (a) + Ev maxf[v   v
(a;h;)];0g + s
u(a;h j a
0;) = (1 + a
0)Y (a;hj);
where
Y (a;hj) := f (e
 (a))   q (1   (v
(a;h;))).
We will refer to Y (a;hj) as the quality of governance when the governor's character-
istics are (a;h), and to yi() := Y (ai;hij) as the quality of candidate i. Note that quality
depends on the levels of the public good and expected taxes. Anti-corruption enforcement,
12, has a direct eect on a candidate's quality (except when h is suciently high), but com-
pensation, s, does not. Quality is bounded above by that of a Saint, ymax := f(e(1)), and
below by that of a Scoundrel, ymin() := Y (0;0j).
In the (a;h)-plane, constant quality curves (dened by the equation Y (a;h j ) = C for
some constant C) are generally downward sloping, because an increase in public spiritedness
is required to oset a decrease in honesty.18 An increase in  (weakly) improves the quality
of any given candidate, thereby inducing a leftward shift in every such curve.
We now turn to the incentive constraints that govern equilibrium. Denote the set of
candidates as N and let N := jNj. As we restrict attention for the moment to pure entry
strategies, N completely describes an equilibrium and N is necessarily nite. The following





































Inequality (4) requires that candidates prefer to enter the campaign rather than stay out,19
whereas inequality (5) requires that non-candidates prefer to stay out rather than enter.




j2N yj(). In the following sections, we will study the eects of the policy
variables s and  on the expected quality of governance, primarily by determining their
eects on the highest and lowest expected quality achievable in any N-candidate equilibrium,
denoted yN(;s) and y
N(;s), respectively. Note that while  can have both incentive and
selection eects | it can aect the post-election behavior of the governor and also aect the
composition of the candidate pool | s can matter only through selection eects.
To characterize equilibria, we need to know which types of non-candidate insiders have
the greatest incentive to run for oce when the quality of governance is y. The expression
uG(a;h j ;s)   (1 + a)y captures the magnitude of that incentive.20 It is straightforward
18The \generally" caveat excludes cases where honesty is already so high that the candidate never sells
out to the interest group.
19If N is a singleton, then the left hand side of (4) is not well dened. We assume that this entry incentive
constraint is always satised when N = 1 because the consequences of having no governor are suciently
dire.
20For this purpose, we can ignore the probability of winning as well as the cost of running because those
factors aect all potential candidates equally. An individual of type (a;h) has a strict incentive to enter if
13that the governor's personal benet from lobbying is weakly decreasing in h. Also, as
shown in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, (a) and Ev maxf[v   v(a;h;)];0g are both convex in
a. Consequently, either Scoundrels or Sell-Outs (or both) have strictly greater incentives to
run than all other insiders. Between Scoundrels and Sell-Outs, the type with the greatest
incentive depends on y and , which dierentially aect their gains from holding oce. Low






= (1)   (0) + (Ev maxfv   v
(1;0;);0g   Ev maxfv   v
(0;0;);0g); (6)
we have:
Lemma 2. Given any set N of candidates, the set of non-candidate insider types with the
greatest incentive to enter (i.e. that maximize uG(a;h j ;s)   (1 + a)yN) consists of Sell-
Outs alone if and only if yN < y(), Scoundrels alone if and only if yN > y(), and both
Sell-Outs and Scoundrels if and only if yN = y().
It follows that (5) is satised for all (ai;hi) if and only if it is satised for Scoundrels






uG (1;0 j ;s)   (N + 1)k
2
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N(;s) provides a lower bound on average quality in an equilibrium with N candi-
dates.
4.1 Single Candidate Equilibria
We rst consider equilibria in which only a single candidate, i, runs for oce. In that case,






uG (1;0 j ;s)   2k
2
;u
G(0;0 j ;s)   2k

: (8)
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Figure 1: Single-Candidate Equilibria, and the 
Effect of Anti-Corruption Enforcement
Scoundrels Sell-Outs
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Thus, provided ymax  y`














and y1(;s) = ymax. As shown in Figure 1, when y`
1(;s) > ymin(), the set of potential
unopposed candidates corresponds to all insiders with characteristics in the lightly-shaded
area above the constant quality curve Y (a;h j ) = y`
1(;s).
Turning to policy analysis, neither s nor  aects the quality of the best possible
candidate, because y1(;s) = ymax so long as single-candidate equilibria exist. We therefore
focus on the quality of the worst possible candidate, y
1(;s).
Consider the eect of varying compensation, s. Trivially, uG(1;0 j ;s) and uG(0;0 j
;s) are strictly increasing in s; therefore, so is y`
1(;s). It follows that an increase in
s strictly improves the quality of the worst possible candidate, y
1(;s), when y`
1(;s) 
ymin(); otherwise, it has no eect (because ymin() is independent of s). In Figure 1, an
increase in s shifts the constant quality curve that bounds the set of potential unopposed
candidates to the north-east. Intuitively, when the rewards to oce-holding are greater,
each insider has more incentive to enter against a candidate of any given quality, so the lower
bound on the quality of any unopposed candidate must rise. However, setting s too high
would eliminate single-candidate equilibria.
15Next consider the eect of varying anti-corruption enforcement, . It is easy to check
that uG(1;0 j ;s) and uG(0;0 j ;s) are strictly decreasing in ; therefore, so is y`
1(;s). It
follows that if y`
1(;s) > ymin(), so that very low quality candidates cannot run unopposed,
an increase in anti-corruption enforcement reduces y
1(;s), worsening the least attractive
equilibrium. This result is somewhat counterintuitive: after all, the policy has a positive
incentive eect of reducing the frequency with which any elected citizen would sell out.
However, there is a detrimental selection eect: because the policy reduces the rents to
holding oce, each insider has less incentive to enter against a candidate of a given quality
y; thus, single candidates of lower quality go unchallenged.
Figure 1 illustrates these eects. The curve labeled Y (a;h j ) = y`
1(;s) identies the
lowest quality candidates who can run unopposed with policy (;s). When  increases to
0, the incentive eect causes the quality of any given candidate to rise, hence the constant
quality curve for the original level of candidate quality shifts left to Y (a;h j 0) = y`
1(;s).
However, there is also a selection eect: in the gure, the boundary that denes the set of
potential unopposed candidates shifts leftward from Y (a;h j ) = y`
1(;s) to Y (a;h j 0) =
y`
1(0;s) < y`
1(;s). The quality of governance in an equilibrium under policy 0 with a
single candidate whose characteristics lie in the darkly-shaded area is lower than for any
single-candidate equilibrium with enforcement level  < 0.
If, contrary to what we assumed in the last two paragraphs, y`
1(;s) < ymin(), then any
candidate can run unopposed. An increase in anti-corruption enforcement is then potentially
benecial because there are no selection eect, and it raises y
1(;s) = ymin().
Note nally that suciently lax anti-corruption enforcement (like suciently high com-
pensation) may eliminate all single candidate equilibria. We return to this point shortly.
4.2 Multiple Candidate Equilibria
Next we consider equilibria with more than one candidate. The analysis of the incentive
constraint for non-candidate insiders, expression (7), is very similar to the case of single
candidate equilibria. Turning to the incentive constraint for candidates, we can rewrite (4)
as
u
G (a;h j ;s)   (1 + a)y  Nk, (9)
where y is the average quality of the other (N   1) candidates. Since uG(a;h j ;s) is






I(a,h | y ,σ,s) = Nk
Figure 2: Willing Candidates
a′ a′′
Y(a,h | σ ) = Y(a ′′,0 | σ ) 
′
I(a,h | y,σ,s) = Nk
Thus, dening I(a;h j y;;s) := uG(a;h j ;s) (1+a)y, the equation I(a;h j y;;s) = Nk
denes the boundary between candidates who are willing and not willing to run for oce,
given N   1 opponents of average quality y.
Next we determine the shape of the aforementioned boundary. Applying the implicit
function theorem to calculate dh







f(e(a))   q(1   [v(a;h;)])   y
gh(h;)(1   [v(a;h;)])
: (10)
Since gh(h;) > 0, the sign of (10) is the same as that of the numerator. As the numerator
is increasing in both a and h, it follows that if the boundary is upward sloping in a at
(a;h), it is upward sloping at all points (a0;h0)  (a;h).21 Thus, for any given y, the willing-
candidate boundary in (a;h)-space is single-troughed. Figure 2 depicts the boundary dened
by I(a;h j y;;s) = Nk, along with the set of willing candidates (lightly shaded).
To identify equilibria, we translate the problem into quality space by dening a corre-
spondence 	 that maps the average quality of N  1 opponents into the quality levels of all
21Here,  is in the usual component-wise vector order.
17candidates who are willing to run:
	N(y j ;s) = fy0 j 9(a;h) 2 [0;1]2 with Y (a;h j ) = y0 and I(a;h j y;;s)  Nkg:
It is immediate from (9) that if y1 > y2, then 	N(y1 j ;s)  	N(y2 j ;s) (i.e., if
the quality of opponents improves, the set of willing candidates shrinks). It follows that
max	N(y j ;s) is weakly decreasing in y.
If the set of willing candidates given N   1 opponents of average quality y, fa;h 2
[0;1]2 j I(a;h j y;;s)  Nkg, is path-connected (as it is in Figure 3), then 	N(y j ;s)
is a convex set.22 However, the set of willing candidates need not be path-connected for
all levels of opponents' quality. An inspection of (9) reveals that when opponents' quality
increases, the willing-candidate boundary shifts downward, and more so at higher values of
a (i.e., for individuals who attach greater weight to quality). Consequently, for y0 > y, the
willing-candidate boundary can intersect the a-axis twice (as does the boundary dened by
I(a;h j y0;;s) = Nk in Figure 2), in which case the set of willing candidates (dark shading
in Figure 2) is not path-connected, and 	N(y0 j ;s) may not be convex.23
Figure 3 illustrates quality-of-willing-candidate correspondences with two candidates,
	2(y j ;s) (for candidate 1, 	2(y2 j ;s) is bounded by the dashed curve, and for candidate
2, 	2(y1 j ;s) is bounded by the solid curve, where yk denotes the quality of candidate k).
We have drawn it as convex-valued for low values of y, but not for moderate values, reecting
the possibilities shown in Figure 2. We have also drawn it as empty for high values of y to
illustrate the possibility that there may be no willing candidates in such cases.
Figure 3 also illustrates how to identify two-candidate equilibria. Plainly, both candi-
dates must be willing to run against each other, a property that is only satised by points
in the light- or dark-shaded areas. The gure also shows the non-candidate incentive con-
straint, expression (7), which simply requires
y1+y2
2  y`
2(;s). Thus the set of equilibrium
quality pairs corresponds to the set of points in the dark-shaded area of the gure.
Two features of Figure 3 merit notice. First, the incentive constraints for candidates
bound average quality from above, while the incentive constraints for non-candidates bound
22This statement follows from the continuity of Y (;j).
23We say \may not be" because 	N(y0 j ;s) could be convex even if the set of willing candidates is not
path-connected. The necessary and sucient condition for non-convexity of 	N(y0 j ;s) is that there are
two solutions to I(a;0 j y0;;s) = Nk, a0 and a00 > a0, such that the constant quality curve passing through








(y2 + y1)/2 = y2(σ,s)
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Equilibria
Figure 3: The Willing-Quantity Correspondence 
and Two-Candidate Equilibria
average quality from below. Thus, in a multi-candidate equilibrium, the candidate pool
tends to be of intermediate quality: neither too good (or opponents would drop out) nor
too bad (or others would enter). Second, because the upper and lower boundaries on the
set of equilibrium quality pairs slope downward, there will tend to be negative correlation
between public-spiritedness and honesty among candidates, even if those characteristics are
unrelated in the population from which candidates are drawn.
In Figure 3, there are both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. Figure 4 illustrates
a case in which all equilibria are asymmetric. In drawing the gure, we have assumed
that due to relatively unfavorable entry conditions, there are values of a for which I(a;0 j
ymin();;s) < Nk, which accounts for the non-convexity of 	N(ymin() j ;s). Only
quality pairs in the darkly-shaded regions are sustainable as equilibria: points in the lightly-
shaded region satisfy the candidate incentive constraints, but not the non-candidate incentive
constraint.24 In such cases, equilibria give rise to substantial random variation in the quality
24Figure 4 therefore illustrates the possibility that the candidate incentive constraint, rather than the
non-candidate incentive constraint, may determine the lower bound on the expected quality of governance.




incentive constraints are satised; yet it has a lower expected quality of governance than any of the equilibria.
It is not an equilibrium because candidate 2's incentive constraint is not satised.
19y1
ymax
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Ψ2(y1 | σ,s) Equilibria
Equilibria
Figure 4: An Example with Only 
Asymmetric Two-Candidate Equilibria
A
(y2 + y1)/2 = y2(σ,s)
ℓ
of governance from election to election. This is not merely a technical curiosity; in Section
4.4, we will see that only analogs of these asymmetric equilibria survive as the costs of
running for oce become small.
Next we examine the eects of the policy variables s and . Analysis of the best
equilibria is straightforward because only the candidate incentive constraint (7) can bind.
Analysis of the worst equilibria is complex because there are three distinct possibilities: the
non-candidate incentive constraint (7) binds, in which case y
N(;s) = y`
N(;s) (as in Figure
3); the candidate incentive constraint (4) binds (as in Figure 4); or neither constraint binds,
in which case y
N(;s) = ymin(). Our key conclusions are summarized as follows:
Theorem 1. Suppose N-candidate equilibria exist for policies (;s), (0;s), and (;s0),
where  < 0 and s < s0 (so that a change from (;s) to (0;s) entails an increase in
anti-corruption enforcement, and a change from (;s) to (;s0) entails an increase in the
governor's compensation). Then:
(i) The best N-candidate equilibrium is no better with higher anti-corruption enforce-
ment (yN(;s)  yN(0;s)), and is better with higher compensation (yN(;s)  yN(;s0),
with strict inequality when yN(;s) < ymax).
(ii) The worst N-candidate equilibrium is:
20(ii-a) worse with higher anti-corruption enforcement (y
N(;s) > y
N(0;s)), and better
with higher compensation (y
N(;s) < y
N(;s0)) if the only binding constraints at the worst
equilibria are the non-candidate incentive constraints (7);25
(ii-b) better with higher anti-corruption enforcement (y
N(;s) < y
N(0;s)) and un-
changed with higher compensation (y
N(;s) = y
N(;s0)) if the only binding constraints at
the worst equililbria are the minimal quality levels (that of Scoundrels);
(ii-c) no worse with higher anti-corruption enforcement (y
N(;s)  y
N(0;s)) and
worse with higher compensation (y
N(;s)  y
N(;s0), with strict inequality when y
N(;s) >
ymin()) if the only binding constraints at the worst equilibria are the candidate incentive
constraints (4), and the changes (0    and s0   s) are suciently small.
Notice that the direction of the eect on the worst equilibria depends on which con-
straint binds. Focusing on the \typical" case in which the non-candidate incentive con-
straint binds at the worst equilibria (as in Figure 3), we see that both the best and worst
N-candidate equilibria (weakly) worsen with greater anti-corruption enforcement. In con-
trast, both (weakly) improve with an increase in the governor's compensation. For the
other two cases | when either the overall lower bound on quality or the candidate incentive
constraint binds at the worst equilibria | the direction of the eects on the worst equilibria
reverse (with one exception, where there is no eect). The remainder of this section explains
these results.
With respect to the worst equilibria, cases (ii-a) and (ii-b) also arose with single-
candidate equilibria, and the results here hold for precisely the same reasons. That leaves
part (i) and case (ii-c), both of which are governed by the candidate incentive constraint.
Consider rst the eects of the governor's compensation, s. Condition (9) implies that that
if s0 > s00, then 	N(y j ;s00)  	N(y j ;s0), i.e., the set of willing-candidate quality levels
expands with s. Clearly, an expansion of 	2(y1 j ;s) and 	2(y2 j ;s) in Figures 3 or
4 would increase the expected quality of governance in the best equilibrium and (weakly)
reduce it in the worst. Next consider anticorruption enforcement, . As argued in the next
paragraph, if 0 > 00, then 	N(y j 0;s)  	N(y j 00;s), i.e., the set of willing-candidate
quality levels contracts with . Consequently, the eects of  are opposite those of s.26
25To be clear, this statement requires that, both before and after the policy change, the only binding
constraints at the worst equilibria are the non-candidate incentive constraints. If the requirement is satised
for the initial policy, it is always satised for the nal policy as well if the change is small. A similar clarifying
remark applies to parts (ii-b) and (ii-c).
26If the set of equilibrium expected quality levels is non-convex, changes in y
N(;s) and yN(;s) do not
21To understand why 	N(y j 0;s)  	N(y j 00;s) for 0 > 00, suppose a candidate
with character (a;h0) is willing to run against N   1 opponents of average quality y when
the enforcement level is 0. Then there is some h00 > h0 such that an (a;h00)-candidate's
disutility from selling out under policy 00 is the same as the (a;h0)-candidate's disutility
from selling out under policy 0 (i.e., g(h00;00) = g(h0;0)). Because quality depends on
h and  only through g, the (a;h00)-candidate's quality under policy 00 is the same as the
(a;h0)-candidate's quality under policy 0. Finally, because a candidate's incentive to enter,
I(a;h j y;;s), also depends on h and  only through g, the fact that the (a;h0)-candidate's
incentive exceeds Nk under policy 0 implies that the (a;h00)-candidate's incentive exceeds
Nk under policy 00.
4.3 Eects on the Number of Candidates
So far, we have focused on policy eects holding xed the number of candidates, N. Unless
a policy change aects the existence of equilibria for some N, the previous section's charac-
terizations of comparative statics for the overall best and worst equilibria continue to apply.
However, a policy change may force a change in the number of candidates by altering the
set of N for which equilibria exist.
It is easy to check that if N0 > N, then y`
N(;s) > y`
N0(;s) (from the denition in (7))
and 	N0(y j ;s)  	N(y j ;s) (since the only change is a lower probability of winning).
Also, N does not aect the quality of any given candidate. Thus, the eects of N and s are
similar, except that the directions are reversed.27 Subject to the qualications noted in our
discussion of Theorem 1, an increase in N therefore tends to reduce both the highest and
lowest quality achievable in equilibrium (assuming the non-candidate incentive constraint
binds).
Intuitively, increases in s make entry more attractive, potentially eliminating equilib-
ria with smaller numbers of candidates, and introducing equilibria with larger numbers of
candidates; increases in  have the opposite eect. It follows that eects on the quality of
governance owing through selection eects that result from changes in N tend to work in
completely characterize the eects of  on the range of expected governance quality. Suppose the set in
question is a sequence of disjoint intervals. In that case, an increase in s (resp. ) increases (resp. decreases)
the upper bound of every interval, and decreases (resp. increases) the lower bound (some of those eects
being strict and some weak). Additional intervals may also appear.
27In fact, increasing N has the same eect on the non-candidate incentive constraint (7) as reducing s by
(N + 1)k, and it has the same eect on the candidate incentive constraint (4) as reducing s by Nk.
22the opposite direction from the eects examined in the previous section. Thus, the overall
eects of the governor's compensation and anti-corruption enforcement on the quality of
governance are surprisingly complex, and subtle technical issues arising from the presence of
integer constraints (including implications for existence of equilibria) render them dicult to
assess. Fortunately, as we show in the next section, the task of evaluating all the pertinent
eects in combination becomes tractable when the costs of running for oce are treated as
vanishingly small, a common assumption in the citizen-candidate literature.
4.4 Equilibria with Small Entry Costs
We now examine the behavior of the model as k becomes vanishingly small. First we note
that the analysis of single-candidate equilibria is essentially unchanged from Section 4.1.
From expression (8), an equilibrium with a single candidate of quality y exists for arbitrarily
small k if and only if
y  max






=: b y(;s): (11)
It follows that ymax  b y(;s) is a necessary and sucient condition for the existence of
single-candidate equilibria in the limit. Moreover, for any candidate with quality in the
interval [b y(;s);ymax], there exists such an equilibrium. Thus, small entry costs do not
generally resolve the multiplicity issue for single-candidate equilibria.
Next we examine equilibria with more than one candidate. Due to integer constraints,
we are unable to derive general conditions that guarantee the existence of pure strategy
equilibria. Consequently, we now broaden the scope of our analysis to include mixed strategy
equilibria, which allows us to assure existence.
We focus on equilibria in which insiders probabilistically run for oce if and only if
they belong to a nite or countably innite set of potential candidates. Formally, a mixed
strategy equilibrium consists of a denumerable set N of dimension N := jNj 2 N [ f+1g,
plus an N-dimensional vector  = (i)i2N, where each i 2 (0;1] is the probability of
the respective insider running. Insiders not in N run with zero probability. Note that
this formulation subsumes pure strategy equilibria. The probabilities of running translate
into probabilities of winning conditional on running for each i 2 N, denoted i (N;).28
The unconditional probability of i winning in equilibrium is ii (N;). In addition, we
28The probability of winning for any set of realized candidates remains uniform, but the realized number
23use yavg (N;) :=
P
j2N jj (N;)yj +[1  
P
j2N jj (N;)]yA to denote the expected
quality of governance when the set N runs with probabilities , where yA is the quality of
governance when there is no governor (which, recall, is assumed to be extremely dire).
Henceforth ( i) will denote the probability vector obtained from  by deleting the
element containing the probability of entry for i 2 N. Thus, if i 2 N changes his probability
of entry from i to zero, the conditional probability of winning for any j 2 Nni changes
to j (Nni;( i)). Likewise, (+i) will denote the probability vector obtained from  by
adding an element indicating that i = 2 N enters with probability one. Thus, if i = 2 N changes
his probability of entering from zero to one, the conditional probabilities of winning for any
j 2 N [ i is j (N [ i;(+i)).
Note that, because all choices and electoral events are independent, the probability of
j 2 N winning conditional on the event that i 2 N does not win is equal to the probability of
j 2 N winning when i does not run, which is jj (N n i;( i)). This implies in particular
that E[y j (N;), and i 2 N does not win] = yavg (Nni;( i)). As a result, for i 2 N, we
have
yavg(N;) = i (N;)y
i + (1   i (N;))yavg(Nni;( i)): (12)
The equilibrium conditions for mixed strategies resemble those for pure strategies. Since
the expected quality of governance is the same regardless of whether i runs and loses or re-
frains from running, i's decision is governed by a comparison between k (the cost of running),
and the probability of winning multiplied by i's gains conditional on winning. Analogous
to (4), the incentive constraint for those who (probabilistically) enter is thus:












with equality when i < 1. For those who do not enter, analogous to (5), the incentive
constraint is:












Since i(;) does not depend on a candidate's character, Lemma 2 continues to apply (with
the obvious notational changes), so (14) holds if and only if it is satised for Sell-Outs and
Scoundrels.
of candidates is now stochastic; i (N;) encompasses both sources of randomness. Note that i (N;)
depends on (j)j2Nni but not on i.
24We are not aware of an equilibrium existence result that applies to the current frame-
work.29 We therefore begin by assuring existence of mixed strategy equilibria (which sub-
sume pure strategy equilibria).
Lemma 3. For any k > 0, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
Recall that single-candidate equilibria do not exist for k suciently small if ymax <
b y(;s). Consequently, under those conditions all equilibria must involve potential entry by
multiple candidates. Henceforth we will refer to any equilibrium (N;) with N > 1 as a
multiple-candidate equilibrium.
In the remainder of the section we focus on ymax < b y(;s) and explore the properties of
multiple-candidate equilibria when the cost of running for oce becomes vanishingly small.
Our rst characterization result establishes that, for each insider who runs for oce (with any
positive probability), the expected probability of winning conditional on running converges
to zero as k ! 0. Clearly, this implies in turn that the expected number of candidates must
grow without bound as running costs vanish. Formally, we have:
Lemma 4. For any " > 0, there exists ^ k (") such that for all k < ^ k ("), every multiple-
candidate equilibrium (N;) satises i(N;) < " for all i 2 N.
The intuition for this result is most transparent when all candidates are of the same
character. In that case, the incentive constraint for non-candidates, expression (13), is
virtually identical in the limit to the incentive constraint for candidates, expression (14),
except that the direction of the inequality is reversed. Thus, if the N-th candidate is willing
to run, an identical (N + 1)-th candidate would also enter.
In light of Lemmas 2 and 4, intuition suggests that as the cost of running for oce
approaches zero, the character of every candidate must approach that of either a Scoundrel
or a Sell-Out in any multiple-candidate equilibrium. For, if a candidate were of any other
type, then with many candidates, an additional candidate | either a Scoundrel or a Sell-Out
| would necessarily have an incentive to enter, breaking the equilibrium. Indeed:
Theorem 2. For any " > 0, there exists ^ k (") > 0 such that when k < ^ k ("), any multiple-
candidate equilibrium, (N;), satises: if n 2 N, then (an;hn) 2 B"(1;0) [ B"(0;0), where
B"(a;h) denotes an open ball of radius " around the point (a;h).
29Following Schmeidler (1973), existence results in games with a continuum of players generally assume
that choices by a measure zero set of opponents do not aect a player's payo. That requirement is
obviously not satised here: for example, if an insider chooses to run, his (expected) payo depends on the
exact number and identities of opponents.
25Having determined that all candidates must be either Sell-Outs or Scoundrels in the
limit, we can now characterize the expected quality of governance. Recall from Lemma 2
that y() is the quality of governance that equalizes the incentives to enter for Sell-Outs and
Scoundrels; for y > y(), Scoundrels have greater incentive to enter than Sell-Outs, and vice
versa for y < y(). Dene






In other words, e y() truncates y() below at the quality of a Scoundrel, and above at the
quality of a Sell-Out.
Theorem 3. For any " > 0, there exists k0 (") > 0 such that when k < k0 ("), any multiple-
candidate equilibrium, (N;), has jyavg(N;)   e y()j  ".
Thus, when the costs of running for oce are suciently small, the expected quality of
governance in any multiple-candidate equilibrium is approximately e y(). To build intuition,
suppose that ymin() < y() < Y (1;0 j ). We know from Theorem 2 that only Sell-Outs
and Scoundrels run for oce. Clearly, the equilibrium cannot consist of all Scoundrels,
because then we would have yavg(N;) = ymin() < y(), which implies that Sell-Outs would
have greater incentive to enter than Scoundrels (by Lemma 2). Similarly, the equilibrium
cannot consist of all Sell-Outs, because then we would have yavg(N;) = Y (1;0j) > y(),
which implies that Scoundrels would have greater incentive to enter than Sell-Outs (again
by Lemma 2). Thus, the equilibrium must involve a mixture of Scoundrels and Sell-Outs.
To preserve a mixture in the limit, Scoundrels and Sell-Outs must have the same incentives
to enter, which implies that yavg(N;) = y().
Together, Theorems 2 and 3 have a surprising and important implication: with small
entry costs, the quality of governance is highly variable. Though all candidates are maxi-
mally dishonest, they vary widely in public spirit. A given election can yield a governor with
either extremely high or extremely low public spirit (Sell-Outs or Scoundrels), and hence ei-
ther the maximum or minimum level of the public good. Thus, analogs of the asymmetric
equilibria identied in Section 4.2 turn out to be the only ones that survive in the limit.
We can now readily determine the limiting distribution of candidates' character types.
Let  denote the limiting fraction of candidates who are Sell-Outs. Then
e y() = 
 [f(e
(1))   q (1   (v
(1;0;)))] + (1   
)[f(e





e y()   [f(e(0)   q (1   (v(0;0;)))]
f(e(1))   f(e(0))
: (15)
Theorem 3 also allows us to determine the eects of our two public policy instruments,
s and , on the expected quality of governance in the limit when k becomes small, assuming
when ymax < b y(;s).30 We begin with s, the governor's compensation. Observe that
e y() is independent of s because y(), ymin(), and Y (1;0 j ) are all independent of s;
hence, in the limit, changes in compensation have no eect on the expected quality of
governance. The explanation for this nding is clear when the equilibrium consists of all
Sell-Outs (e y() = Y (1;0 j )) or all Scoundrels (e y() = ymin()): in such cases there
are no candidate selection eects, and selection provides the only channel through which
compensation can inuence the quality of governance. When Sell-Outs and Scoundrels
both run for oce (ymin() < y() < Y (1;0 j )), selection eects are present but, in the
limit, the typically benecial eects of an increase in s for xed N exactly oset the typically
detrimental eects associated with stimulating additional entry.
Next we consider the eects of , the level of anti-corruption enforcement. Plainly,






(0;0;))] > 0: (16)
It follows that e y() is also strictly increasing in . Thus, in the limit as the costs of running
for oce become vanishingly small, an increase in  unambiguously improves the quality of
governance. The explanation is again is clear when the equilibrium consists of all Sell-Outs
or all Scoundrels: with no selection eects, an increase in  must be benecial because it
reduces the inuence of special interests on the governor's decisions. When Sell-Outs and
Scoundrels both run for oce with positive probability, both direct selection eects (xing N)
and indirect selection eects (through changes in N), which here are treated in combination,
are also present. If an increase in  reduced Scoundrels' and Sell-Outs' incentives to run
for oce by equal amounts, then the same expected quality of governance would continue to
equalize those incentives, and the policy change would yield no benets, despite a reduction
in the propensity for any given governor to accommodate special interests (the mix would
simply shift toward Scoundrels by an osetting amount). But in fact, an increase in  has
30Plainly, with small k, if ymax  b y(;s) either an increase in s or a decrease in  can shift the equilibrium
from a single candidate to multiple candidates.
27a larger eect on the incentives to run for Scoundrels than for Sell-Outs. Thus, higher
expected quality is required to restore equal incentives to run for oce.
While the direction of this eect is consistent with simple intuition, the mechanism is
rather surprising. Recall from Theorem 1 that if the number of candidates is held xed,
the positive inuence of anti-corruption enforcement on a governor's incentives are typically
more than oset by perverse direct selection eects. Thus, for a wide range of parameter
values, anti-corruption enforcement is on balance benecial only because it also reduces the
number of candidates in equilibrium, thereby indirectly improving selection.
It is generally ambiguous whether an increase  on balance raises or lowers , the
ratio of Sell-Outs to Scoundrels among candidates; i.e., whether the indirect selection eects
(associated with changes in N) are larger or smaller than the direct selection eects (for a
xed N). We evaluate the combined selection eects by dierentiating  with respect to 




g(0;)([(v(1;0;))   (v(0;0;))]   q(g(0;) + q))
f(e(1))   f(e(0))
: (17)





f(e(1)) f(e(0)) < 0, so long as  < 1. A fortiori, if the density
(v) is non-increasing on [v(0;0;);v(1;0;)], then in the limit as k becomes vanishingly
small, raising  generates an unfavorable overall selection eect with respect to public-
spiritedness.32 To reconcile this observation with our preceding discussion, note that even
though the overall selection eect is unfavorable, the (benecial) indirect selection from
the reduced number of candidates provides enough of an oset to the (detrimental) direct
selection eect so that when combined with the (benecial) incentive eect on any governor's
behavior, the net eect on expected governance quality is positive.
On the other hand, it is evident from (17) that reasonable parameters can also yield
d
d > 0, for example if the density (v) is suciently increasing on the relevant interval.
In these cases, as k becomes vanishingly small, a stronger anti-corruption policy generates
a benecial overall selection eect, because the indirect selection eect dominates the direct
selection eect.
31The expression below is derived from (15) by noting that an interior  requires ~ y() = y() and then
using the derivative computed in (16).
32More generally, we see from (17) that for any given distribution (v), there will be an unfavorable overall
selection eect if , the governor's bargaining power, is suciently small.
28The following corollary summarizes our policy conclusions:
Corollary 1. If ymax < b y(;s), then in the limit as the costs of running (k) become vanish-
ingly small (so that only multiple-candidate equilibria exist), an increase in anti-corruption
enforcement () strictly increases the expected quality of governance but may increase or
decrease the fraction of Sell-Outs relative to Scoundrels, while a change in the governor's
compensation (s) has no impact on the expected quality of governance or the composition of
the candidate pool.
4.5 The Roles of Some Key Assumptions
In this section, we clarify the roles of some key assumptions concerning the observability
of candidates' characters, the presence of special interest politics, and the eects of public
spiritedness.
We have assumed that the electorate cannot observe a non-incumbent candidate's char-
acter. In practice, such candidates usually have track records in other positions. Our
somewhat stark assumption captures the plausible hypothesis that prior experience does not
entirely reveal a candidate's character.33 Were we to make the opposite extreme assumption
that the electorate observes each candidate's character perfectly, our results would change
dramatically. In every equilibrium all candidates would necessarily be of the same quality,
and there would always be equilibria where only Saints run.
Special interest politics also play a central role. In the absence of the lobby group,
only single-candidate equilibria with a lower bound on quality exist when s is not too large.
When s becomes large enough, multiple-candidate equilibria emerge; with vanishing running
costs, there is an essentially unique equilibrium with a mixture of maximally and minimally
public-spirited candidates (depending on parameter values). However, without lobbying,
one would not see how special interest politics can distort self-selection incentives toward less
public-spirited insiders (and not simply toward less honest ones), who have relatively more
to gain from securing oce in their presence. Moreover, if there are no inuence activities,
one cannot investigate the eect of anti-corruption enforcement on the quality of governance.
Heterogeneity with respect to public spiritedness also plays a central role. If all insiders
were equally public spirited, selection eects would not be present in the limiting case with
33With partial revelation of a candidate's character, the public would naturally prefer candidates of higher
expected quality. Thus, successful candidates would be drawn from the still heterogeneous pool of insiders
with the highest expected quality.
29small entry costs. The candidate pool would be homogeneous (consisting only of maximally
dishonest insiders), the eects of anti-corruption enforcement would be conned to incentives,
and the variability in the quality of governance would vanish.
5 Incumbency and Term Limits
We now turn to the eects of incumbency on the quality of governance. Assuming character
is at least partially revealed during a governor's rst term, reelection opportunities can
promote better governance through two channels. The rst is mechanical: the electorate
gains opportunities to reelect desirable incumbents. The second operates through self-
selection eects: the benets of running for oce in the rst place rise for high-quality
candidates (for whom the odds of re-election are high) relative to low-quality candidates (for
whom the odds are low). This section explores these eects and also identies why, perhaps
surprisingly, longer term limits can also have adverse selection eects. Throughout this
section, to avoid uninteresting cases, we assume that ymax < ^ y(;s) and ymin() < y() <
Y (1;0 j ).34
5.1 Self-Selection Benets of Reelection Opportunities
The impact of incumbency on candidate selection is most easily illustrated through a simple
\reduced form" extension of our basic model to two periods; subsequently we will discuss how
to enrich it. Assume that a governor of quality y is re-elected with an exogenous probability
(y) that is non-decreasing in y, so that higher quality incumbents are re-elected (weakly)
more frequently. Further assume that the net gains from holding oce for two terms are
 > 1 times those from holding oce for a single term.35 Thus, when the probability
of winning conditional on running is  and the alternative quality of governance is y0, a
candidate with characteristics (a;h) will be willing to run if and only if
(1 + (Y (a;hj)))

u
G (a;h j ;s)   (1 + a)y
0
 k:
34Recall that these conditions ensure that equilibria of the baseline model with vanishing running costs
involve multiple candidates, with the candidate pool consisting of both Sell-Outs and Scoundrels.
35Implicitly, we assume that the expected quality of the non-incumbent candidate pool, y0, is the same in
the rst and second periods.
30The following result shows that if Sell-Outs are re-elected with strictly higher probability
than near-Scoundrels, then for small running costs, the expected quality of governance in
the rst period of the two-period model is strictly higher than y(), the expected quality of
governance in the original model.
Theorem 4. Suppose (Y (1;0 j )) > (y) for all y within some neighborhood of ymin().
Then for some " > 0, there exists k0 > 0 such that when k < k0, any multi-candidate
equilibrium of the extended model, (N;), has yavg(N;)  y() + ".
It follows that the ability to re-elect better governors has a benecial selection eect on
the candidate pool in non-incumbent elections, in addition to any direct benet of re-electing
good governors. The logic of this result is straightforward. With  = 0 (in eect, the one-
period model), the set of insiders with the greatest incentives to run consists of Sell-Outs
alone when the average quality of governance, call it y, is less than y(), and both Sell-Outs
and Scoundrels when y = y(). Thus, with strictly positive  and y  y(), Sell-Outs have
strictly greater incentives to run than any lower quality candidate. Consequently, y  y()
rules out the possibility that, with vanishingly small entry costs, any candidate of quality
y() or lower would run. It follows that y  y() is not sustainable in equilibrium.
So far we have imposed transparent but exogenous assumptions concerning re-election
bids. That is both a virtue and a limitation. It is not hard, however, to see that similar
results hold when the second-period election is modeled explicitly. Assume for simplicity that
a governor's character is necessary revealed while in oce. Because the second period of the
two-period model closely resembles the single-period model, the most natural continuation
equilibrium has the property that the average quality of challengers (if any run) is y(); the
incumbent runs for re-election if and only if his quality is at least y(), and he wins when he
runs.36 Thus,  endogenously satises the assumption in Theorem 4. Though the benets
from holding oce for two terms is not a xed multiple of the benets from holding oce for
a single term,37 the main insight developed in the context of our simple reduced-form model
36To describe an equilibrium, one must specify voters' beliefs about the average quality of non-incumbent
candidates for out-of-equilibrium realizations (i.e., ones in which the number of candidates falls outside the
support of the equilibrium distribution). Unless one introduces belief restrictions, the set of equilibria is large,
and many equilibria have implausible properties. We opted for the simple reduced-form model presented in
the text to avoid a lengthy treatment of these technical and ultimately unenlightening complications.
37In equilibrium, the expected quality of the non-incumbent candidate pools in the rst and second periods
will dier, contrary to the simplifying assumption we implicitly made to justify the application of the xed
multiple . The simplifying assumption remains reasonable, however, because it is likely to hold in stationary
environments where \endgame eects" are not present.
31| that re-election opportunities improve expected candidate quality in the rst-period non-
incumbent election | carries over, for essentially the same reasons. In some cases (e.g.,
when citizens heavily discount future payos), the rst-period candidate pool still consists
of only Sell-Outs and Scoundrels, but a higher fraction are Sell-Outs than in the one-period
model. The fact that Sell-Outs seek and win re-election (whereas Scoundrels do not) bears
out the adage that voters prefer a known crook to an unknown crook.
The two-period model is somewhat articial because a non-incumbent candidate in the
second period has no opportunity to seek re-election. This can be remedied by considering
an innite-horizon model but maintaining a two-term limit. Similar equilibria also exist in
such a model. However, other types of equilibria also emerge, some with even higher gover-
nance quality. In the Supplementary Appendix, we restrict attention to Markovian equilib-
ria (thereby ruling out equilibria that \bootstrap" cooperation through history-dependent
strategies), and show that if second-term compensation is suciently high, there are equi-
libria that deliver any quality of governance between [Y (1;0 j );ymax] in every period.
5.2 Self-Selection Costs of Reelection Opportunities
The possibility of re-election can also have pernicious selection eects if lower-quality candi-
dates benet more from re-election than higher-quality candidates. Such eects can emerge
if, as many have suggested, more senior politicians are able to extract greater pork and/or
rents from holding oce, e.g. by cultivating relationships with large contributors or ob-
taining appointments to powerful committees. To capture that possibility, we adopt the
same simplifying framework (with exogenous re-election probabilities) and make the same
assumptions as in Theorem 4, with the following exception: the fraction of lobbying surplus
extracted by an incumbent governor, 2, exceeds , the fraction extracted by a rst-term
governor. With that modication, we obtain:





(ymax) > 0 and k < ^ k, any multi-candidate equilibrium of the extended model, (N;), has
yavg(N;)  y()   .
Thus, if incumbency confers additional bargaining power with special interests, then
unless the electorate can dierentiate suciently well between governors of good and bad
character, the possibility of re-election causes adverse self-selection in non-incumbent elec-
tions. Intuitively, an increase in the governor's ability to extract rents from the lobby group
32resembles a decrease in anti-corruption policy: while it generally increases the benets to
holding oce (xing the quality of opponents), the eect on the entry incentives is greatest
for Scoundrels because they accept special interest transfers more often than all other types.
Taking the boundary case where () is constant and 2 = , we know that the set of insiders
with the greatest incentives to run consists of Scoundrels alone when the average quality of
governance, call it y, is greater than y(), and both Scoundrels and Sell-Outs when y = y().
Thus, with 2 >  and y  y(), Scoundrels have strictly greater incentives to run than
any candidate of higher quality. Consequently, y  y() rules out the possibility that, with
vanishingly small entry costs, any candidate of quality y() or higher would run. It follows
that y  y() is not sustainable in equilibrium.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have examined the impact of special interest politics on the self-selected character of
politicians, including honesty and public spirit. Our analysis emphasizes the role of selection
eects in determining the quality of governance. The eects of public policy instruments,
such as the level of the governor's compensation or the intensity of anti-corruption enforce-
ment, turn out to be surprisingly complex. Nevertheless, a number of robust (and in some
cases unexpected) ndings emerge, which we have summarized in Section 1 and hence will
not repeat here. We conclude instead by mentioning some interesting avenues for future
research.
The analysis in Section 5 illustrated how the possibility of re-election and incumbency
can have both benecial and adverse self-selection eects on the candidate pool, in addition
to direct screening benets. While we focussed for simplicity on making these points by
comparing two-term limits with one-term limits, the ndings suggest that it may be fruitful to
explore more systematically the optimal length of term limits to balance out these opposing
eects on self-selection.
We have assumed throughout that insiders dier only with respect to honesty and
public-spiritedness. Another potentially interesting dimension along which candidates may
dier is the relative weight they attach to monetary payments, public goods, eort, and
honesty. To take a simple case, suppose insiders are dierentiated by a third characteristic,
m 2 [0;1], that acts as a multiplier for all monetary payos (larger m indicating greater
weight on money relative to other considerations). In multiple-candidate equilibria, elections
33will tend to attract those with higher values of m. The potential implications for the eects of
compensation and anti-corruption enforcement are intriguing. An increase in compensation,
s, will tend to attract candidates with higher values of m, which is deleterious insofar as such
individuals will more easily succumb to the inuence of special interests. Thus, increasing
compensation may reduce the quality of governance. On the other hand, increasing anti-
corruption enforcement, , will not have that eect.
34Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The rst statement follows from the discussion of the Nash-bargaining
outcome prior to the Lemma: if v < v(a;h;), the governor does not implement the project;
if v > v(a;h;), he does and receives a transfer t such that t v(a;h;) = (v v(a;h;)).
For the second statement, note that 1 (v(a;h;)) is the probability of project implemen-
tation. Whenever the project is implemented, non-governor citizens with public spirit a0 suf-
fer a disutility of (1+a0)q; thus, the citizen's expected cost is (1+a0)q [1   (v(a;h;))].
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix the policies (;s) and dene
(a;h;y) := u
G(a;h j ;s)   (1 + a)y
= (1 + a)f (e
 (a))   c(e
 (a)) + Ev maxf(v   g(h;)   (1 + a)q);0g + s   (1 + a)y:
Fix any y. The goal is to determine which pairs of (a;h) maximize (;;y). Since
g(h;) is strictly increasing in h, (a;h;y) is weakly decreasing in h; moreover, by Assump-
tion 3, (a;h;y) is strictly decreasing for h suciently small. Thus, for each a, (a;h;y)





(a;0;y) = f (e









2(g(0;) + (1 + a)q) > 0:
Thus, the function (a;0;y) is convex in a, hence is maximized only at either a = 0 or a = 1
(or both). The proof is completed by observing that
(1;0;y)   (0;0;y) = u
G(1;0j;s)   u
G(0;0j;s)   y = y()   y;
where the 2nd equality is by the denition in (6).
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is via a number of steps.
Step 1: Suppose we have an N-candidate slate N 0 that satises the candidate incentive
constraints with anti-corruption enforcement 0. Then for  < 0 there exists an N-candidate
35slate N that satises the candidate incentive constraints with anti-corruption enforcement
, such that yN() = yN0(0).
For each i 2 N 0, we claim that there exists some j(i) with aj(i) = ai such that
Y (a
j(i);h




To see this, note rst that if g(hi;0) + (1 + ai)q  v, agent i would never implement
the special-interest project, hence Y (a;h j 0) = f(e(ai)). We can then take j(i) such
that (aj(i);h(j(i)) = (ai;1), since a maximally honest agent never implements special interest
projects, no matter the level of anti-corruption enforcement (Assumption 3). So suppose
that g(hi;0)+(1+ai)q < v. Then, because g(hi;) < g(hi;0) while g(1;)+(1+ai)q > v
(by Assumption 3), the continuity of g(;) implies that there is some h 2 (hi;1) such that
g(h;) = g(hi;0). We choose j(i) such that (aj(i);hj(i)) = (ai;h).
Now we claim that, with anti-corruption enforcement , the slate N = fj(1);:::;j(N)g
satises the candidate incentive constraint (4). To see this, observe that since (18) holds























In other words, the expected candidate quality is the same if i withdraws from slate N 0
under 0, and if j(i) withdraws from slate N under . Next note that for any i = 1;:::;N,
the payo to holding oce, uG(ai;hi j 0;s) = uG(aj(i);hj(i) j ;s) because, by construction,
either (i) both i and j(i) never accept lobby payments (under 0 and  respectively), or (ii)
g(hi;0) = g(hj(i);). It now follows that the candidate incentive constraint (4) holds for all
candidates in N under .
Step 2: Proof of parts (i) and (ii-c), with respect to anti-corruption enforcement.
First we prove the statements concerning the eects of a change in anti-corruption en-
forcement. Consider a change from (0;s) to (;s) where 0 > , and where N-candidate
equilibria exist in both cases. By Step 1, there exists an N-candidate slate NA that sat-
ises the candidate incentive constraints under (;s) such that yNA() = yN(0;s), and an
N-candidate slate NB that satises the candidate incentive constraints under (;s) such
that yNB() = y
N(0;s) > y`
N(0;s) (where the inequality holds because the non-candidate
incentive constraint is assumed not to bind).
Now consider part (i). Since the non-candidate incentive constraints amount to a lower
36bound, y`
N(;s), on equilibrium expected candidate quality under (;s), and because N-
candidate equilibria are assumed to exist under (;s), either NA is an equilibrium slate
under (;s), or there is some other equilibrium slate under (;s) for which the expected
candidate quality exceeds yNA(), and hence yN(0;s).
Now consider part (ii-c). Since y`
N(;s) is continuous, we have yNB() = y
N(0;s) >
y`




Step 3: Suppose we have an N-candidate slate, N, that satises the candidate incentive
constraints with compensation s. Then for any s0 > s, N satises the candidate incentive
constraints with strict inequality from inspection of (4) and the observation that uG(a;hj;s)
is strictly increasing in s.
Step 4: Proof of parts (i) and (ii-c), with respect to the governor's compensation.
Consider a change from (;s) to (;s0) where s0 > s, and where N-candidate equilibria
exist in both cases. By Step 3, there exists an N-candidate slate NA that strictly satis-
es the candidate incentive constraints under (;s0) such that yNA() = yN(;s), and an
N-candidate slate NB that satises the candidate incentive constraints under (;s0) such
that yNB() = y
N(;s) > y`
N(;s) (where the inequality holds because the non-candidate
incentive constraint is assumed not to bind).
Now consider part (i). Assume rst that y`
N(;s0)  yN(;s) = yNA(). In that case, NA
is an equilibrium slate under s0. Now suppose in addition that yN(;s) < ymax. Because
the candidate incentive constraints hold with strict inequality, and because u and uG are
continuous in a and h, there exists another slate, NC, for which yNC() > yN(;s) 
y`
N(;s0), and that satises the candidate incentive constraints. Plainly NC is an equilibrium
slate under s0. Next assume that y`
N(;s0) > yN(;s) = yNA(). In that case NA is not an
equilibrium slate under s0, but we have assumed that an equilibrium slate, NC, exists, and
it is necessarily the case that yNC()  y`
N(;s0) > yN(;s).
Now consider part (ii-c). Because y`
N(;s) is continuous, we have yNB() = y
N(;s) >
y`
N(;s0) for s0   s suciently small. Thus, NB is an equilibrium slate under . Next
assume that y
N(;s) > ymin(). Because the candidate incentive constraints hold with
strict inequality, and because u and uG are continuous in a and h, there exists another slate,
NC, for which y
N(;s) > yNC() > y`
N(;s0), and that satises the candidate incentive
constraints. Plainly NC is an equilibrium slate under s0.







N(;s0). It is straightforward to check that
uG, and hence y`
N(;s), are strictly increasing in s and strictly decreasing in , from which




N(0;s) = ymin(0). Trivally, ymin() is independent of s. Moreover, it is
straightforward to check that ymin() is strictly increasing in .
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix any k > 0 and consider a sequence of restricted models, indexed by
m, such that in model m there are 2m insiders, consisting of m Sell-Outs and m Scoundrels.
For each restricted model in this sequence, the entry game is nite and hence a mixed-
strategy equilibrium exists. Fix any selection of equilibria in the sequence of restricted
models.
Case 1: Suppose rst that, for some m, the equilibrium has at least one Sell-Out and at
least one Scoundrel entering with zero probability. Then (13) is satised for all insiders who
enter with strictly positive probability, and (14) is satised for all insiders who enter with
zero probability. This equilibrium remains an equilibrium when any number of Sell-Outs
and Scoundrels are added so long as they enter with zero probability: (13) is unaected and
therefore still satised for those who enter with positive probability; while (14) is unaected
and therefore still satised by the original insiders who enter with zero probability as well
as the new insiders. By Lemma 2, it follows that (14) is also satised for any new insiders
of other character types. Therefore, the equilibrium of model m is also an equilibrium of
the unrestricted model, featuring a nite number of candidates.
Case 2: Now suppose that, for all m restricted models, either all Sell-Outs or all
Scoundrels (or both) enter with non-zero probability. Let b m be the associated vector
of entry probabilities for Sell-Outs, listed in non-increasing order, and let b m denote the
associated vector of entry probabilities for Scoundrels, again listed in non-increasing order.
Note that (13) implies that there must be strictly positive lower bound on the probability
of winning conditional on running, and hence an upper bound, call it Cmax, on the expected









For each m, dene countably-innite-dimensional vectors m and m such that m
i = b m
i
and m
i = b m
i for i = 1;:::;m, and m
i = m








max; i  0, and i  i+1 for i = 1;2;:::
)
:
A key property to note is:




because the elements are in non-increasing order and
P
i i  Cmax. Endow  with the
Chebyshev norm, D, i.e for any 0;00 2 , D(0;00) := maxi j0
i   00
i j.38 One can verify
that  (endowed with D) is compact.39 Thus, there is a subsequence for which m and





i . Also, 1
i and 1
i are each non-increasing in i. For the remainder
of the proof, restrict attention to the subsequence.
Now consider the unrestricted model, with the continuum of insiders. Let N be the
countable set consisting of Nso Sell-Outs and Nsc Scoundrels, where Nso := supfi : 1
i > 0g
and Nsc := supfi : 1
i > 0g (either could be innite). Let  assign the entry probability
1
i to the i-th Sell-Out in N, and the probability 1
i to the i-th Scoundrel in N. We will
show that (N;) is a mixed strategy equilibrium.
We rst verify the candidate incentive constraint (13). We provide the argument for any
Sell-Outs in N; it is virtual identical for any Scoundrels. Pick any Sell-Out i 2 N. Since
m
i ! 1
i > 0, it must be that m
i > 0 innitely often in m; focus on these cases. In the





i denote the expected probability
with which the i-th Sell-Out wins conditional on running, ym
avg denote the expected quality
of governance, and ym
avg( i) denote the expected quality of governance when i does not run.











with equality when m
i 2 (0;1). One can show that as m ! 1, m
i ! i (N;) and
38Because of (19), the max is well dened even though  is innite-dimensional.
39To prove compactness, note that (19) implies that for any " > 0, there is a some i0 such that for all
i  i0, any  2  has i < ", and hence for any ;0 2 , maxi<i0 ji   0
ij < " implies D(;0) < ". It
follows that  is totally bounded. It is routine to verify that  is complete.
39ym
avg ! yavg (N;),40 from which it also follows that ym
avg( i) ! yavg(Nni;( i)).41 Thus,




G (1;0 j ;s)   2yavg (Nni;( i))

 k,
with equality whenever 1
i < 1 (because then we must have m
i 2 (0;1) for all large enough
m). We have thus veried that (13) holds any Sell-Out in N.
The proof is completed by showing that the non-candidate incentive constraint (14)
holds for any insider i = 2 N, no matter his character type. By Lemma 2, it suces to
check incentives for Sell-Outs and Scoundrels. We will provide the argument for Sell-Outs;
Scoundrels can be treated mutatis mutandis.
We divide the argument into two cases. First suppose there exists a subsequence of the
restricted models such that for all large enough m, there is some Sell-Out im who does not
enter in the equilibrium of the m-th model. Let m(+i) denote the probability with which
an individual i who does not run in the equilibrium of model m would win if he ran. The
non-candidate incentive constraint for im implies that for any Sell-Out i who does not run










One can show that m(+i) ! i (N [ i;(+i)) as m ! 1.42 Thus, passing to limits
in (21), we have
i (N [ i;(+i))

u
G (1;0 j ;s)   2yavg (N;)

 k;
40A proof for the convergence of m
i goes as follows (the argument for convergence of ym
avg is along the same
lines): Let RK
i (;) be i's probability of winning conditional on running when the rst K Sell-Outs and
Scoundrels running according to the probabilities given in (;) 2 2, while all others run with probability
zero. Let BK be some strict upper bound on the probability that one or more members of N other than the
rst K Sell-Outs and Scoundrels runs, given (1;1). Note that (19) implies that by taking K suciently
large we can make BK arbitrarily small. Also note that BK bounds the same probability for (m;m) when











 < BK for
large m. Moreover, because the probability of winning conditional on running is continuous in the entry
probabilities for any nite set of agents, RK
i (m;m) ! RK
i (1;1) as m ! 1. Therefore, for any " > 0,
there exists M such that jm










i . Given the immediately preceding convergence statements, taking limits
delivers the desired conclusion.
42The argument is analogous to that given in fn. 40.
40which establishes that (14) holds for any Sell-Out i = 2 N.
Now consider the other possibility: in any subsequence of restricted models, it is in-
nitely often the case that all Sell-Outs enter with positive probability in the model's equi-
lbirium. Then it is possible to nd a subsequence of m and a Sell-Out in each model, call
him im, such that for all large m, 1 > im(m) > 0 and limm!1 im(m) = 0 (recall (19)). As












Now pick any Sell-Out i = 2 N. Observe that the dierence between m
im and m(+i)
owes only to im; similarly for the dierence between the dierence between ym
avg( im)
and ym
avg. Since limm!1 im(m) = 0, it follows that limm!1 m
im = limm!1 m(+i) and
limm!1 ym
avg( im) = limm!1 ym






















= i (N [ i;(+i))

u
G (1;0 j ;s)   2yavg (N;)

;
which establishes that (14) holds (with equality) for any Sell-Out i = 2 N.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose the claim is false. Then for some " > 0 there exists an innite
sequence of positive entry costs km ! 0, and a sequence of associated equilibria (N m;m)
such that each N m contains some im with im(N m;m)  2".













m(c) := Pr[jCj = c j (N
m;
m), i
m = 2 C]: (23)
41For any i = 2 N m, we have
i(N
m [ i;









































In other words, any non-candidate who enters would win with expected probability at
least ". For each equilibrium (N m;m), the non-candidate incentive constraint must be




























G (0;0 j ;s)   y
max;u






The left-hand side of (26) is independent of m, and by the hypothesis that b y(;s) > ymax,
it is also strictly positive. On the other hand, since " > 0 is a constant and km ! 0, the
right-hand side of (26) converges to zero as m ! 1. Consequently, for m suciently large
the right-hand side must be less than the left-hand side, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose the theorem does not hold for some " > 0. Then it must
be possible to select a sequence of entry costs km ! 0 for which there is a corresponding
sequence of multi-candidate equilibria, (N m;m) with jN mj = Nm, such that for each m the
set N m includes some im with (aim;him) = 2 B"(1;0)[B"(0;0). The incentive constraints (4)


























i (N m [ i;m(+i))
im (N m;m)
: (28)
Let y := limm!1 yavg(N m;m) (if necessary, focus on subsequence that converges, which is
assured since yavg() lives in a compact space). The proof now proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: limm!1 yavg(N mnim;m( im)) = y.




















The desired conclusion then follows from the facts that im (N m;m) ! 0 (Lemma 4) whereas
the quality of governance is bounded.
Step 2: limm!1 Rm = 1.
We will argue that limm!1
1
Rm = 1. Since im (N m;m) > i (N m [ i;m(+i)), it
suces to show that that the limit of 1
































where P m(c) is given by (23). Now choose any integer K  1. Given that all the terms






































































































Suppose, as we will prove subsequently, that





















A = 0: (29)
Then for any K 2 N, limm!1
1
Rm  K+2
K+1, which implies that limm!1
1
Rm  1, completing
the proof of Step 2. Consequently, all that remains is to prove (29).
Observe that for any convergent sequences m and  m, limm!1
m
 m = 0 if and only if
limm!1
m






















A = 0 (30)
With respect to the denominator in (30), we note that 1















Em (c) + 1
; (31)
where Em() is the expectation using the distribution P m(c).











The right-hand side of (32) represents the probability of having no more than K \suc-
cesses" in jN m n imj independent trials, where each trial i has a probability of success m
i .
There are now two cases to consider.
Case 1: Suppose rst that there is some subsequence of m such that Nm < 1 for all
m in the subsequence. Then, Theorem 4 of Hoeding (1956) implies that the right-hand
side of (32) is bounded above by the corresponding probability for a binomial distribution
with Nm   1 independent trials and a constant success probability m := Em(c)=(Nm   1),
provided K  Em(c)   1. Thus, for m suciently large (so that Em(c) > K, which Lemma













c (1   
m)
Nm 1 c : (33)
Since the binomial distribution corresponding to the right-hand side of (33) is single-peaked
and has mode no smaller than Em(c)   1, for suciently large m (so that once again K <











K (1   
m)
Nm 1 K




K (1   
m)
Nm 1 K
= (K + 1)(E
m(c))
K (1   
m)
Em(c)=m K : (34)



















m (c) + 1)(K + 1)(E
m(c))
K (1   
m)
Em(c)=m K
 (K + 1)(E
m(c) + 1)
K+1 (1   
m)
Em(c)=m K :
There are now two possibilities to consider. The rst is that there is some  2 (0;1) such
45that m > 1    for m suciently large. In that case, for large enough m,
(K + 1)(E
m(c) + 1)
K+1 (1   
m)




As m ! 1, Em(c) ! 1 and Em(c) K dominates (Em(c) + 1)
K+1, so the expression on
right-hand side of (35) converges to zero. Thus, (30) follows immediately for this case.
The second possibility is that there is no such . In that case, we can assume without
loss of generality that m ! 0 as m ! 1 (if necessary by restricting attention to a convergent
subsequence). We then have limm!1 (1   m)
1=m
= 1






m suciently large we have
(K + 1)(E
m(c) + 1)
K (1   
m)
Em(c)=m K  (K + 1)(E
m(c) + 1)
K 
Em(c) (1   
m)
 K : (36)
As m ! 1, Em(c) ! 1 and Em(c) dominates (Em(c) + 1)
K, while (1   m)
 K ! 1,
so the expression on the right-hand side of (36) converges to zero. Thus, (30) follows for
this case as well.
Case 2: Now suppose that in any subsequence of the original sequence of m, Nm = 1 in-
nitely often. Pick any subsequence where Nm = 1 for all m. We will use a subscript of n on
Em
n (c) and P m
n to denote the respective objects when the set N m is restricted to a nite subset
of the rst n candidates, and let m
n := Em
n (c)=n. Then, because
PK




for any n (adding individuals can only increase the number of realized candidates), the same
argument as in Case 1 can now be applied to a large enough subset of N m, allowing us to






















































For any xed m, as n ! 1, Em
n (c) ! Em(c) < 1 (as was discussed in the proof of
Lemma 3), hence m









































As m ! 1, Em(c) ! 1 and e Em(c) dominates (Em(c) + 1)K+1, hence the expression
on the right-hand side above converges to zero. Thus, (30) follows.
Step 3: Proof of the theorem.
Suppose without loss of generality that the sequence hypothesized at the start of the
proof, (aim;him), converges to some limit (a;h), if necessary choosing a subsequence of the
original sequence. Since (aim;him) = 2 B"(1;0) [ B"(0;0) for any m, it must also be that




























where the equality uses Steps 1 and 2 and the continuity of (). However, Lemma 2
implies that maxf(0;0;y);(1;0;y)g > (a;h;y) for (a;h) = 2 B"(1;0) [ B"(0;0),
a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose the theorem is false for some " > 0. Then it is possible to
select a sequence of entry costs km ! 0 for which there is a corresponding sequence of multi-
candidate equilibria, (N m;m), such that for each m, jyavg(N m;m)   e y()j > ". Without
loss of generality, we can assume that yavg(N m;m) converges to a limit point y1, with either
(i) y1 > e y()+" for some " > 0 and yavg(N m;m) > e y()+" for all m, or (ii) y1 < e y() "
for some " > 0 and yavg(N m < e y()   " for all m. (If necessary, choose an appropriate
subsequence of the original sequence.) We will focus on case (i); the argument for case (ii)
47is symmetric (replacing Sell-Outs with Scoundrels, and vice versa).
Because yavg(N m;m) > e y() + " for all m, Theorem 2 implies that there must be
im 2 N m for each m such that (aim;him) ! (1;0) (a Sell-Out) as m ! 1. Furthermore,


















where Rm is dened by (28). Taking limits as m ! 1 (and invoking the continuity of (),
the fact that jN mj grows without bound, and Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 2), we have
0  (1;0;y1)   (0;0;y1):
But with y1 > e y(), the right-hand side above is strictly negative by Lemma 2, a contra-
diction.
Proof of Theorem 4. Dene

(a;h;y) := [1 + (Y (a;h j ))](a;h;y):
From Lemma 2, we know that (1;0;y)  (a;h;y) for all (a;h) 6= (1;0) and y  y(),
with strict equality except for (a;h;y) = (0;0;y()). As long as (1;0;y) > 0, given our
assumption on , we have (1;0;y) > (a;h;y) for all (a;h) 6= (1;0) with Y (a;h j ) 
Y (1;0 j ) and y  y(). By continuity of  in its third argument, for any 1 > 0 and some
small 2 > 0, the same statement holds for Y (a;h j )  Y (1;0 j ) 1 and y  y()+2.
Now assume the theorem is false. Then it must be possible to select some sequence of
entry costs km ! 0 for which there is a corresponding sequence of multi-candidate equilib-
ria, (Nm;m) such that limm!1 yavg(Nm;m)  y(). By the argument in the preceding
paragraph, for suciently large m, Sell-Outs would have strictly greater incentives to enter
than any other type (a;h) with Y (a;h j )  Y (1;0 j )   1. Through an argument
paralleling the one given in the proof of Theorem 3, one can then show that, in the limit, the
quality of the worst candidate must converge to a limit no less than Y (1;0 j ). But that
implication contradicts the assumption that average quality converges to a limit no greater
than y().
48Proof of Theorem 5. For this proof we will augment the arguments of  to including ,
writing (a;h;y;). It is easily veried that  is weakly decreasing in , and strictly so
for any a;h such that v   v(a;h;) > 0, which is the case for any a and h = 0.
Fix 2 > . Dene

;2(a;h;y) := (a;h;y;) + (Y (a;h j ))(a;h;y;2):
Dene C to be the set of character types of quality strictly less than
ymin()+y()
2 . From
Lemma 2 we know that (a;h;y;)   (0;0;y;)  0 for all y  y() and (a;h) 6= (0;0),
with strict inequality when y > y() or (a;h) 6= (1;0). Thus, if (ymax) = (ymin()), then









By the continuity of , there exist "; > 0 with y()  >
ymin()+y()
2 such that (39) holds
for all y  y()    provided (ymax) < (ymin()) + ".
We claim that the theorem holds for the " and  dened in the previous paragraph.
Assume not. Then there is some non-decreasing () satisfying (ymax) < (ymin())+" such
that it is possible to select a sequence of entry costs km ! 0 for which there is a corresponding
sequence of multi-candidate equilibria, (Nm;m), such that yavg(Nm;m) > y() . From
the preceding paragraph, we know that for all m, Scoundrels have a strictly greater incentive
to enter than any type with quality exceeding
ymin()+y()
2 . Through an argument paralleling
the one given in the proof of Theorem 3, one can then show that, in the limit as m ! 0, the
quality of the best candidate cannot exceed
ymin()+y()
2 < y()   . But that contradicts
the assumption that yavg(Nm;m) > y()    for all m.
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